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JACOB S. SHERKOW

And How: Mayo v. Prometheus and the Method of
Invention
The Mayo Court's novel test for patent eligibility - whether or not an invention
involves "well-understood, routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in by
researchers in the field" -focuses on how an invention is accomplished rather than
what an invention is. That concern with the method if invention poses several
normative, statutory, and administrative difficulties. Taken seriously, the "how"
requirement will likely have broad qfects across all levels ofpatent practice.
INTRODUCTION

In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 1 the Supreme
Court invalidated the asserted patents' process claims as unpatentable subject
matter under § 101 of the patent statute. 2 The Court gave three principal
justifications for its rejection. First, the process claims were directed to "laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."3 Second, in any event, the
patent did not contain enough of an "inventive concept" to ensure that it
"amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself."4 And
third, the invention involved "well-understood, routine, conventional activity,
previously engaged in by researchers in the field."5

1.

No. w-1l50 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/llpdf/w-1l50.pdf
(to bereportedatl32S. Ct. 1289).

2.

35 U.S.c. § WI (2006). Citations of the patent statute throughout this Essay, unless
otherwise noted, refer to its provisions effective March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 , 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35
U.S.c.).

3.

Mayo, slip 0p. at 2.

4.

ld. at 3.

5.

ld. at 4.
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Much has been written - and will continue to be written - about those first
two justifications. But commentators thus far have paid less attention to the
third. Interestingly, the third justification is quite different from the first two.
Rather than focusing on what the invention is, it focuses on how the invention
is accomplished. That is, the Court's first two justifications concern the
characterization of the invention itself: the thing or process purported to be
invented, the language of the claims, and the significance of the invention to
the field. The third justification, however, concerns the method by which the
invention is implemented, whether a "conventional activity" or a unique
method.
Given the novelty of that justification6 (and how recently Mayo was
decided), the consequences of the additional inquiry remain unclear.
Nonetheless, the Mayo Court's new focus on how an invention is conceived-a
condition on which patent eligibility depends - appears to pose several
doctrinal and practical difficulties. First, it fails to distinguish true "inventions"
from unpatentable abstractions in contravention of § 101'S historical purpose.
Second, it confusingly overlaps with another requirement in the patent statute:
nonobviousness. Third, it violates the principle that patent eligibility should
not be tied to "the manner in which the invention is made." And last, it
requires the patent office to engage in "on the ground" factfinding, even
though there are scant administrative procedures for that task.
I.

FAILING TO DISTINGUISH ABSTRACTIONS

A requirement to consider how an invention operates does not fulfill the
historical purpose of § 101: to distinguish patent-eligible "inventions" from
unpatentable abstractions. 7 The Supreme Court's prior interpretations of § 101
embody this concern. 8 Although § 101'S text does not define the concept of

6.

The Mayo Court's rule denying eligibility to inventions involving "well-understood, routine,
conventional activity, previously engaged in by researchers in the field" was completely
novel at the time, neither adopted nor even suggested by any previous court.

7.

See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62,119 (1853) (concluding that the patent statute
embodies the English rule against patenting mere "principles"); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) (denying patent eligibility to a "principle," because it was not
"practically applied in the construction of a useful article of commerce or manufacture").

8.

See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1982) ("This Court has undoubtedly
recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.
Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas."); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) ("The line between a patentable 'process'
and an unpatentable 'principle' is not always clear."); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972) ("Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract
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"invention," it permits a patent application for "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."9 The statute's broad
language has long been thought to encompass "anything under the sun made
by man"l0 and to serve as little more than a threshold inquiry.11 Nonetheless,
this threshold inquiry made ineligible patent applications involving abstract
ideas, mathematical equations, or mental processes. 12 Yet it also left other
applications to the remaining rigors of the patent statute. 13 Even then, § 101
was not thought to prohibit patents monopolizing discrete applications of such
abstractions, such as manufacturing equipment that relied on certain
mathematical formulae. 14
The Court's novel patent-eligibility test-rendering ineligible inventions
involving "well-understood, routine, conventional activity, previously engaged
in by researchers in the field,,1 5 - does little to accomplish the goal of
distinguishing "inventions" from "abstractions." Because inventions, both
physical and abstract, operate in a variety of ways, an examination of how they
operate fails to separate the concrete from the conceptual. Both physical and
abstract inventions, for example, can call upon "well-understood, routine,
conventional activity." Many inventions in the life sciences, for example, use
well-understood, routine, and conventional mechanisms, even though they
concretely apply to real world phenomena. 16 At the same time, new and useful,

intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.").
9.

35 U.S.c. § 101 (2006).

10.

Diamond v. Chalrrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REp. No. 82-1979, at 5
(1952)).

11.

See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) ("The § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is
only a threshold test."); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 ("Arrhenius' equation is not patentable in
isolation, but when a process for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more
efficient solution of the equation, that process is at the very least not barred at the threshold
by § 101.").

12.

See Parker, 437 U.S. at 588-89 (describing the history of§ 101).

13.

See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.

14.

Parker, 437 U.S. at 594 ("Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula
may be wellimown, an inventive application of the principle may be patented."); see also
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (allowing a patent for an automated rubber molding press that used

15.

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., No. 1O-1150, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Mar. 20,
2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/llpdf/IO-1150.pdf (to be reported at 132 S. Ct.
1289).

16.

This is the rule "with respect to chemical products, as to which simple, routine reactions can
often produce dramatic changes in the products' structure and properties." Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Isolated genes, for example, are

the Arrhenius equation).
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but abstract, mathematical proofs may rely on poorly understood, infrequently
used, unorthodox mechanisms to obtain their results.17 The Court's inquiry
into how an invention or an idea solves a particular problem does no work to
distinguish between inventions and ideas themselves.
II. OVERLAPPING WITH OBVIOUSNESS

The Mayo Court's concern with how an invention is accomplished, relative
to the state of the art in its field, overlaps with the patent statute's proscription
against "obviousness," thus rendering much of it superfluous. Section 103 of
the patent statute denies a patent to an invention "if the differences between
the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a
whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art.'n8 That standard
necessarily requires some inquiry into how the invention solved a problem in
its field, specifically, whether the invention uses old or new methods. 19
Section 103'S standard significantly overlaps with the Mayo Court's view of
patent eligibility as turning on "well-understood, routine, conventional
activity, previously engaged in by researchers in the field. mo The two inquiries
share multiple, similar concerns that are difficult to distinguish: (1) routine vs.
ordinary activity; (2) a researcher in the field vs. a person having ordinary skill
in the art; and (3) previous engagement vs. activity before the effective filing
date of the invention. What is the significant difference, for example, between a
"researcher in the field" and a "person having ordinary skill in the art"? The

often created through little more than "routine skill in the art," even though iliey also
encompass concrete, chemical compositions. See In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1356-57 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
17.

For example, the Four Color Theorem, a mathematical problem important to geometry and
cartography that, although first proposed in 1852, was not proved until 1976 - by
supercomputer, a method mathematicians found controversial at the time. See RUDOLF
FRITSCH & GERDA FRITSCH, THE FOUR COLOR THEOREM, at vii (1998) (describing the
"controversy over the modern methods used in the proof').

18.

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(C), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011) (to be
codified at 35 U.S.c. § 103).

19.

See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) ("The combination of familiar
elements according to lmown methods is lil<:ely to be obvious when it does no more than
yield predictable results."); see also Michael Abramowicz & John F. DufiY, The Inducement
Standard if Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1673 (2011) ("Section 103 does not state that
evidence of the manner of invention cannot be considered; its passive wording indicates that
the manner of invention may be relevant but cannot alone be sufficient to determine
patentability.") .

20.

Mayo, slip op. at 4.
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Mayo Court's conception of patent eligibility almost swallows obviousness as a
condition for patentability. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of the invention
that does not involve "well-understood, routine, conventional activity,
previously engaged in by researchers in the field,"21 but is "obvious before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in
the art.»22 The "how" of the Mayo Court's patent eligibility inquiry appears to
diminish the "how" of the obviousness requirement. 23
III. DISCRIMINATING AGAINST THE ttMANNER OF INVENTION"

Similarly, the Court's concern with how an invention is created may violate
§ 103'S bar against "negat[ingJ," i.e., denying, patentability according to "the
manner in which the invention was made.»24 This protection seeks to treat
equally inventions made by "long toil and experimentation" and those created
in a "flash of genius."2 5 Yet denying patent eligibility to inventions that operate
through "well-understood, routine, conventional activity" may discriminate
against inventions made by "long toil and experimentation." The reason is that
inventions employing "well-understood, routine, conventional activity" are
often created through "long toil and experimentation." Inventions in chemistry
or molecular biology, for example, frequently operate using "well-understood,
routine, conventional" mechanisms, such as drugs developed by traditional
chemical-screening methods. 26 In the fields of chemistry and biology, advances
in those mechanisms are typically introduced through "trial and error" rather
than sudden "flashes of genius."2 7 In contrast, inventions that work in an
unconventional manner are often the result of creative syntheses across
multiple technologies that stem from "flashes of genius.»28

21.

ld.

22.

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(C), 125 Stat. at 287 (to be codified at 35 U.S.c. § 103)
("Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.").

23.

While the Mayo Court aclmowledged some overlap between its test for § 101 and other parts
of the patent statute, it is unclear whether it also recognized this for § 103. See Mayo, slip op.
at 21 ("We recognize that, in evaluating the significance of additional steps, the § 101 patenteligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap.").

24.

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(C), 125 Stat. at 287 (to be codified at35 U.S.c. § 103).

25.

35 U.S.c. § 103 (2006) (1952 Historical and Revision Notes).

26.

See Jacob S. Sherkow, Negativing Invention, 2011 BYU L. REv. 1091,1121-22.

27.

ld. at 1120 (discussing how chemistry and molecular biology "typically create inventions by
more laborious and empirical processes, while other disciplines' inventions germinate
primarily from the mind alone").

28.

ld. at 1116-17.

355

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

201 3

The patent in Mayo illuminates this point. That patent claimed a method of
optimizing a patient's drug dosage by measuring a particular metabolite in the
patient's blood - a "well understood, routine, and conventional" method for
altering drug dosage. 29 It is unsurprising, therefore, that the key to the
invention - the ability to determine the particular level of the metabolite - was
ascertained through rigorous clinical studies,3 0 exemplars of "long toil and
experimentation" rather than "flashes of genius." In that sense, denying patent
eligibility according to how an invention works essentially negates patentability
according to its method of invention. 31
IV. REQ.UIRING ADMINISTRATIVE FACTFINDING

The addition of "how" to the patent eligibility inquiry poses administrative
difficulties as well. Asking whether an activity involves "well-understood,
routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in by researchers in the
field"3 2 would require the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to actually
determine whether researchers in the field considered an activity routine or
conventional, and whether those researchers had truly engaged in that activity.
The PTO is poorly equipped to handle that inquiry. Much of the PTO's
current work involves assessing prior art: reading technical documents to
ascertain whether a patent application is "new" or "nonobvious" in the field. 33
Although the Court's "well-understood, routine, conventional activity" test
greatly overlaps with "nonobviousness,"34 prior art seems ill-equipped to prove
"routine" or "convention." Rather, questions concerning an activity's
routineness or conventionality, and questions whether researchers have
performed that activity, appear much more rooted in an on-the-ground factual

29.

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., No. 10-1150, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Mar. 20,
2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/1O-1150.pdf (to be reported at 132 S. Ct.
1289).

30.

See id. at 4-5 (discussing the clinical studies).

31.

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(C), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011) (to be
codified at 35 U.S.c. § 103).

32.

Mayo, slip op. at 10.

33.

34.

See To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance if Competition and Patent Law and Policy, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION 9-10 (2003), http://www.fi:c.gov/OS/2003/1O/innovationrpt.pdf ("With
yearly applications approximating 300,000, they arrive at the rate of about 1,000 each
working day. A corps of some 3,000 examiners must deal with the flood of ftlings. Hearings
participants estimated that patent examiners have from 8 to 25 hours to read and understand
each application, search for prior art, evaluate patentability, communicate with the
applicant, work out necessary revisions, and reach and write up conclusions.").
See supra Part II.
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assessment. "Routine" and "convention" are issues of practice, not necessarily
publication, and there may be a significant delay between when researchers
begin to engage in such activities and when they publicly declare they are doing
SO.35 In other areas, such as the Daubert standard for the admissibility of
scientific evidence,36 surveying the landscape of complex technical practice is
often better left to witnesses rather than documentary testimonyY Currently,
however, the PTO has few administrative procedures to hear such testimony. 38
Nor does there seem to be any movement to expand them. 39 Despite the
Court's interest in tying patent eligibility to practical activity, it is unclear how
the PTO will obtain the tools it needs to make such assessments. The PTO's
expertise, rather, lies in determining what inventions are, not how those
inventions were made.
CONCLUSION

The future will tell whether this philosophical shift in patent eligibility,
from what to how, will have the legal effects discussed in this Essay. If it does,
its practical effects will likely be felt across all levels of the patent complex:
research, invention, prosecution, enforcement, litigation, and licensing.
Research institutions concerned with obtaining intellectual property for their
investments will likely steer funds away from "conventional" research. The
PTO will need to equip itself with the proper administrative tools to assess onthe-ground research behavior. Inventors will likely paint their claims with

35.

See Jorge L. Contreras, Corifronting the Crisis in Scientific Publishing: Latency, Licensing and
Acce.s:5 44 (Program on Info. Justice & Intellectual Prop. Research Paper No. 2012-11, 2012),
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi ?article= lo35&context=research
(discussing the delay between scientific research and publication).

36.

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (allowing judges to assess,
among other factors, whether scientific evidence is employed by '''a relevant scientific
community,'" and to make '''an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance
within that community'" (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir.
1985))).

37.

Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 827,858 n.127 (2011)
(" [TJhe clarity-enhancing virtues of live testimony might still counsel in favor of a live
Daubert hearing, at least if the testimony in question is fairly complex.").

38. Jeffrey P. Kushan, The Fruits oj the Convoluted Road to Patent Riform: The New Invalidity
Proceedings oj the Patent and Trademark Office, 30 YALE L. &POL'y REv. 385, 412 (2012) (" [IJn
the typical case, the PTO will not hear live testimony from witnesses, nor will it use a lay
jury to assess disputed scientific facts - the [appellate] fact finder will be a panel of judges
with relevant technical training who will evaluate written pleadings and documentary
evidence.").
39.

See id. at 413-14.
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more detail to give the impression that their methods are not routine in the
field. And litigators will be even more encouraged to canvass scientific experts
to testifY that a scientific method is, or is not, "well-understood."
All of that work will be devoted to analyzing whether an invention is even
eligible to be patented, let alone valid or invalid under the remaining portions of
the statute. As previous assessments of patent eligibility were rooted in more
facial inquiries, such as whether an invention was "abstract," the Court's recent
focus on the method of invention is a difference not just in degree, but in kind.
Patent practitioners will need to prepare for these changes - and how.
Jacob S. Sherkow is a fellow at the Center for Law and the Biosciences at Stanford
Law School. He gives thanks to Hank Greely, Mark A. Lemley, Matt Lamkin, and
Sarah R Wasserman Rajec for their comments.
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